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Resumen 
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la dinámica del comercio internacional de 
cereales en el primer tercio del siglo XX. Para ello se estudiará su evolución a lo 
largo de ese periodo, comparándola también con la del comercio del conjunto de 
productos agrarios y alimentos. Además, se examinará la composición por 
productos de este comercio. Para el trigo, maíz y arroz se estudiará el 
funcionamiento de sus mercados, con especial atención a los flujos de importación 
y exportación entre consumidores y productores. Para comprender mejor el 
funcionamiento del mercado de estos productos, se examinará la evolución de su 
oferta, demanda y precios. 
 
Palabras clave: Comercio internacional agroalimentario, Comercio de cereales, 
Gran Depresión. 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the dynamics of international trade in cereals in 
the first third of the twentieth century. To this end we will study its evolution over 
this period, comparing it also with the general trade of food and agricultural 
products. In addition, we will examine the structure of this trade. For wheat, maize 
and rice we will examine the operation of their respective markets, with special 
attention to the import and export flows between consumers and producers. To 
better understand the functioning of the market for these products, we will examine 
the changes in supply, demand and prices. 
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1. Introduction 
International trade expanded in the long XIX century (that is, up to and including 
the First World War). The reasons for this growth are clear, although there exists an 
interesting debate on the importance of each of them: incomes rose, the cost of maritime 
and overland transport fell and a general trend towards free trade took place (Findlay and 
O’Rourke, 2007; Jacks, 2006). Moreover, a highly stable international monetary system, 
based on the gold standard and which gradually included more and more countries, also 
favoured the integration of the international goods markets (Estevadeordal et al., 2003). 
The upsurge in trade, together with mass transoceanic migrations of workers and 
movements of capitals, were the essential components of the first globalizing wave 
(O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999).  
Agricultural and food products were a key component of the increase in 
international trade, approximately half of which consisted of food products and agricultural 
commodities (Lewis, 1981). Moreover, inter-industrial trade (i.e. between manufactures 
and primary goods) is fundamental to the explanation of international exchanges of goods. 
The increasing integration of markets also had a significant impact on agriculture (Pinilla 
and Ayuda, 2010). Thus, the agricultural depression widespread at the end of the XIX 
century was a direct outcome of intensifying competition, in European markets, between 
continental farmers and those from other countries, mainly the Americas and the eastern 
fringes of Europe, where huge tracts of new land were being brought into cultivation 
(Tracy, 1964; O’Rourke, 1997). 
The agricultural trade trend between 1900 and 1913 prolonged the growth witnessed 
in the nineteenth century, which then fell sharply during the First World War, to then 
recover and expand rapidly until the crash of 1929, when it initially dipped and then 
stagnated. Overall, between 1903 and 1938, agricultural trade grew at an annual growth rate 
of 1.4%, considerably less than the rate of 3.7% achieved in the second half of the XIX 
century. The sharp slowdown in the growth of trade in this period is the result of an 
external political shock (World War I) and of the economic shock resulting from the crisis 
that began in 1929, which deeply affected international trade. Until 1913 the volume of 
international trade in agricultural raw materials and food grew at an annual rate of 3.3%, 
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very similar to that of the preceding decades. During the war years trade volume 
experienced a negative annual growth rate of 10.9%. Trade plunged during these years, 
since Europe (the principal importer of agricultural products in this period) was the region 
most affected by the war. The period between the end of the First World War and the 
beginning of the Depression was marked by a rapid recovery in the volume of international 
trade. By 1925 agricultural trade had recovered to 1913 levels, and between 1921 and 1929 
the world volume of agrifood exports grew at an annual rate of 7%. Economic crisis, and 
the spread of protectionism worldwide, caused international trade to fall. From 1929 to 
1934 the volume of international trade in agricultural products diminished by 13% in 
absolute terms, although a slight recovery in the latter years of the decade resulted in an 
annual negative growth rate of 1.2% for the 1930s as a whole2. 
Given this background, the aim of this paper is to analyse the dynamics of 
international trade in cereals in the first third of the twentieth century. To this end we will 
study its evolution over this period, comparing it also with the general trade of food and 
agricultural products. In addition, we will examine the structure of this trade. For wheat, 
maize and rice we will examine the operation of their respective markets, with special 
attention to the import and export flows between consumers and producers. To better 
understand the functioning of the market for these products, we will examine the changes in 
supply, demand and prices. 
The study first analyses international cereal trade as a whole, to then examine its 
principal products, especially wheat, to which we shall dedicate a large part of this study, 
maize and rice. 
 
2. International trade in cereals 
2.1. The evolution of world trade in cereals 
In the first third of the XX century cereals represented a very important, although 
declining, part of the international trade in agricultural products, oscillating between 20.6% 
in 1909-13 and 14.7% in 1934-38 (Table 1). 
                                            
2All the data and calculations of this introduction for agricultural international trade are from Aparicio et al. 
(2009). 
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Table 1: International imports of agricultural and food products and cereals (at 1925 
prices, in thousands of U.S. dollars)  
 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38
1. Cereals 2,565,501 2,761,312 2,880,691 2,384,736
2. Agricultural and 
food products 
12,434,144 16,231,905 17,263,358 16,194,206
% 1/2 20.6 17.0 16.7 14.7
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
  
This importance reflects their role as a principal source of energy in human 
foodstuffs in those years. By 1928, cereals provided over 50 per cent of the calories in the 
diet of the majority of countries, except in the United States where they accounted for 
approximately 30 per cent. The cereals trade displayed a clear rising tendency until 1914, 
falling significantly during the war years (Figure 1). The prewar level was not reached until 
1927. The principal difference between the evolution of their trade and that of agricultural 
products as a whole is that in the case of cereals, this was the maximum achieved in the 
entire period, while for all agricultural products the volume of exchanges continued to 
increase until 1929. From that moment on, the volume of total agricultural trade decreased 
without again reaching this level of exchanges, although it approached that level from 
1933-34 onwards. By contrast, the cereals trade showed no sign of recovery following its 
decrease after the crash of 1929.  
The fall in international exchanges of goods due to the crisis of 1929 was principally 
due to the depth of the depression, the dismemberment of the traditional channels of trade, 
the expansion of protectionism and the increase in the importance of bilateral agreements as 
a way of settling trade movements (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007). The shortage of payment 
methods also had repercussions on the decrease in international exchanges and explains in 
part the proliferation of bilateral agreements (Eichengreen, 1996). Neither must it be 
forgotten that in the selection of trade partners, political harmony began to be important, as 
a consequence of the increasing tensions among European countries and the formation of 
trade blocs. In the case of cereals, moreover, a greater consumption of national cereals and 
an increased usage of natural pastures to feed livestock, in place of imported cereals, were 
also important. 
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Figure 1: International imports of cereals and agricultural and food products (at 1925 
prices, in thousands of US dollars) (logarithmic scale) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
      
 
 
To explain the loss of importance of cereals within total agricultural trade, the 
increasing number and volume of agricultural products participating in international 
exchanges must be borne in mind. Furthermore, of great importance was the depressive 
effect exercised by the protectionist policies implemented in the principal countries 
importing cereals, following the First World War, and in particular from 1932 on. Another 
factor to be remembered was the slow growth in the demand for these products, because 
demographic growth in Europe slowed from the 1920s on. In addition, there can be 
observed a tendency towards a greater variety in the diet of the industrialized countries as 
per capita income rose, that is to say, as revenue rose the demand for cereals fell and that 
for fruit and meat increased. The demand for cereals had a negative income elasticity3. 
                                            
3
 Numerous studies undertaken in the 1940s and 1950s showed that in the developed countries their demand 
elasticity with regard to income was systematically negative. For a summary of these studies, see Malembaum 
(1953), pp. 68-76. 
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Within cereals as a whole, wheat was without a doubt the most important, followed 
by rice, maize and barley (table 2). The relative weight of wheat only fell in the 1930s, 
while the relative importance of rice and maize increased continuously, although these last 
two cereals were far distanced from wheat with regard to their importance. Also of note 
was the sharp fall in the importance of barley following the war, due to the sharp fall in 
Russian exports, which accounted for over 67% of worldwide exports in 1909-13. The fall 
in the exchanges of rye was the consequence in the weakening of its demand, as the 
consumption of rye bread was replaced by wheat bread in the majority of countries which 
were important consumers of the latter cereal. With regard to oats, these lost importance as 
a consequence of the mechanisation of agriculture, with the replacement of horses by 
tractors in agricultural labour (Grigg, 1992; Federico, 2005).  
 
Table 2: Relative weight of trade of cereals (percentages) 
 
 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38
Wheat 52.2 56.7 55.9 48.6
Rye 4.9 3.6 2.7 2.3
Barley 10.5 5.5 5.9 5.2
Oats 5.2 2.5 2.1 1.5
Maize 11.8 13.0 14.4 18.3
Rice 15.4 18.7 19.0 24.1
Cereals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Wheat flour and rye are included in their respective products 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
 
If we examine the evolution in absolute terms of trade in the distinct cereals, it was 
rice which most increased, tripling its exchanges from the beginning of the century until the 
end of the 1930s (Table 3). At the opposite extreme were oats. In general, the volume of 
exchanges of all cereals increased until the First World War. During the war, there took 
place a fall in the exchanges of all cereals, one much more pronounced in the case of barley 
and oats than in the others. Possibly, this sharp fall in the volume of international trade in 
rye and oats was due to the geographical localization of exchanges. In both cases, three 
significant importers, Germany, Austria and Belgium, ceased purchasing (at least through 
official channels) possibly as a result of the Allied blockade (Offer, 1989). Another 
important importer of rye and oats, the Netherlands, reduced its imports of rye from an 
average of 5.7 million quintals in the period 1909-13 to an average of 245,000 quintals 
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between 1915 and 1919, and of rye from an average of 8 million quintal in 1909-13 to an 
average of 846,000 quintals in 1915-19, due to its difficulties in achieving supplies because 
of the Allied blockade of the continent. The lowest fall in trade volume as a result of the 
war was the case of rice (a mere 12 per cent), while the cereal whose international trade 
was most affected was barley, with a fall of 80.3 per cent. Cereals as a whole experienced a 
fall of 35 per cent as a result of the war. Following the conflict, wheat, rye, barley and oats 
reached their maximum level of exchanges in the period 1925-29. International trade in 
wheat fell in the following years. By contrast, international exchanges of rye, barley and 
oats continued to fall until the end of the period. Maize reached its maximum volume of 
trade in 1930-34, exchanges falling in the late 1930s. Only rice experienced continuous 
growth in its trade volume throughout the first third of the XX century. 
 
Table 3: Evolution of trade of cereals (index numbers, 100 = 1903-1907) 
 
 Wheat Rye Barley Oats Maize Rice Total 
Cereals 
1903-04 96 109 98 84 93 99 96 
1905-09 102 92 104 107 95 118 102 
1910-14 121 126 125 134 109 217 130 
1915-19 90 29 25 80 55 191 84 
1920-24 125 89 47 60 103 177 114 
1925-29 144 90 79 68 133 269 141 
1930-34 129 75 77 54 147 278 134 
1935-38 105 54 61 37 165 306 122 
Wheat flour and rye flour are included in their respective products 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
 
The degree of trading in the distinct cereals did not reach in any case 20 per cent of 
production (Table 4). This indicates that the majority of production was consumed in the 
country in which it was produced. However, in some countries strongly oriented to foreign 
markets, such as Canada, Argentina and Australia, the percentage of wheat production 
traded exceeded on average 50 per cent of their production. Wheat was the most traded 
cereal, although this diminished in the late 1930s, due to the difficulties of importing it. 
With regard to barley, there took place an important fall following the war, as Russian 
exports practically disappeared. Only maize increased its trading throughout the period. 
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One of the causes of this increase was the tendency to substitute other cereals destined to 
livestock feed by maize and the need to import animal feed when certain European 
countries protected livestock production. With regard to rice, the absence of data from 
China, the principal producer and consumer country of rice in the world, overestimates its 
trade. 
 
Table 4: Percentage of internationally traded grain production 
 
 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38
Wheat 18.9 19.3 18.4 b) 12.9
Rye 5.4 4.1 3.2 c) 3.1
Barley 15.6 9.2 9.0 c) 1.5
Oats 4.9 2.5 2.2 d) 1.6
Maize 7.2 7.5 8.5 d) 9.7
Rice a) 9.7 8.7 e) 8.8 e) 9.1
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
a) Average production 1909-12.b) Without data for the Soviet Union in 1938.c) Without data for the Soviet Union in 
1936-37 and 1938.d) Without data for the Soviet Union in 1936, 1937 and 1938.e) Without data for China.  
 
 
2.2. The geography of international trade in cereals 
 Europe was the geographical area par excellence in the import of cereals. Prior to 
the war, European imports accounted for over 80 per cent of the total. This percentage fell 
over time, and by 1934-38 was only 63 per cent (Table 5). Among the factors responsible 
for this loss of relative importance were the protectionist policies which became 
generalized following the First World War and, to a lesser degree, the slowing down of 
population growth, the diversification of European diets as per capita incomes increased 
and the increasing importance of other geographical areas as significant importers of 
cereals. Here should be underlined the increasing importance of Asian countries as 
consumers of cereals, due to the increasingly important trade in rice in Asia, although they 
also increased their consumption of other types of cereals, due to population and income 
growth.  
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Table 5: Regional composition of imports of cereals (world imports at 1925 prices in 
thousands of US dollars) 
 
 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38 
Europe 2,121,108 1,979,371 1,990,825 1,502,985 
North & C. America 68,580 121,988 114,732 180,522 
South America 57,884 94,857 95,998 90,028 
Asia 253,561 477,590 585,412 528,045 
Africa 80,185 73,804 84,106 71,723 
Oceania 5,299 13,703 9,618 11,433 
Total 2,565,501 2,761,312 2,880,691 2,384,736 
     
% 1909-1913 1924-1928 1928-1932 1934-1938 
Europe 82.7 71.7 69.1 63.0 
North & C. America 2.7 4.4 4.0 7.6 
South America 2.3 3.4 3.3 3.8 
Asia 9.9 17.3 20.3 22.1 
Africa 3.1 2.7 2.9 3.0 
Oceania 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
 
 
With regard to exports, their origin was much more diversified (table 6). Prior to the 
First World War, Europe was not only the principal importing region, but also supplied 
nearly 50 per cent of exports. However, following the war, this situation changed. Europe 
was overtaken by the countries of the American and Asian continents (especially due to the 
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from among the exporting countries leading the 
international grain trade). The South American or Asian countries gradually consolidated 
themselves as the most important exporters, thanks to a certain specialisation in the most 
dynamic cereals: maize and rice. 
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Table 6: Regional composition of exports of cereals (world exports at 1925 prices in 
thousands of US dollars) 
 
 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38 
Europe 1,160,701 354,611 454,548 345,008 
North & C. America 379,967 946,735 746,004 444,615 
South America 307,638 507,960 577,425 513,653 
Asia 360,321 393,308 416,088 480,936 
Africa 33,112 56,908 79,703 74,069 
Oceania 84,449 152,275 186,193 171,863 
Total 2,326,187 2,411,797 2,459,960 2,030,145 
     
% 1909-1913 1924-1928 1928-1932 1934-1938 
Europe 49.9 14.7 18.5 17.0 
North & C. America 16.3 39.3 30.3 21.9 
South America 13.2 21.1 23.5 25.3 
Asia 15.5 16.3 16.9 23.7 
Africa 1.4 2.4 3.2 3.6 
Oceania 3.6 6.3 7.6 8.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
 
3. World trade in wheat  
3.1. The evolution of world trade in wheat 
From the onset of the first wave of globalisation, wheat was one of the key products 
in international trade. It has been common to signal the abolition of the Corn Laws in Great 
Britain in 1846 as one of the decisive factors in the process of liberalisation which took 
place (Sharp, 2009). Progress in market integration in that century has been estimated using 
precisely prices of wheat, which was a product strongly representative of international trade 
(Jacks, 2005 and 2006; Federico and Pearsson, 2007; Sharp and Weisdorf, 2013).  
The European demand for wheat, and especially British demand, was the decisive 
factor in the growth of its trade in the XIX century. The problems of the end of the century, 
and particularly the competition which for European farmers meant the increasing arrival of 
wheat from the East (the Russian Empire) and from the West (above all the United States), 
marked the functioning of its market. The maintenance of free trade policies in countries 
such as Great Britain, the Low Countries and Denmark was the exception rather than the 
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rule. The large continental countries, such as Germany, France, Italy or Spain, imposed 
protectionist barriers which gave a certain margin to their farmers to compete with foreign 
production, on the condition that they modernize their farms, introducing innovations such 
as chemical fertilizers or machinery (O’Rourke, 1997; Gallego, 2003; Clar and Pinilla, 
2009, Vivier, 2009; Grant, 2009). These protectionist restrictions were combined with 
population increase and a continuous rise in per capita income, which meant that some 
countries continued to substitute cereals such as rye by wheat, as this was preferred when 
the population had higher incomes. Production increased appreciably from the crisis at the 
end of the century (56% between 1885-89 and 1909-14), especially among the largest 
exporters which more than doubled it, while among the European importers it increased 
slightly (17%), as a consequence of small increases in the large continental countries 
(Malenbaum, 1953).  
Figure 2: International trade in wheat and other cereals (at 1925 prices, in thousands 
of US dollars)  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938), Wheat flour is included 
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From 1900, exchanges increased until the First World War, descended sharply 
during the conflict and recovered from 1918 on. The annual rate of growth from 1903 until 
1913 was 3.2 per cent annually. Following the conflict, this was 5.9 per cent from 1918 
until 1931 and -5.6 per cent between 1931 and 1938 (Figure 2). 
Until the First World War trade in wheat was characterised by the stability of 
demand emanating from the European free trade countries, while that proceeding from the 
protectionist countries was highly irregular. The war and the decline of European 
production, as well as the end of Russian exports, stimulated a greater growth of production 
in overseas countries, which increased their production very significantly (by 46%) 
between 1914 and 1925, while in the rest of the world rates of increase were in general 
negative. Exports from those countries also increased significantly. 
In the decade of 1920 the market began to display unequivocal signs of saturation. 
During the 1930s worldwide exports of wheat and flour decreased. This fall was 
approximately 65 million quintals between 1928-32 and 1934-38. The principal explanation 
is to be found in the increasing self-sufficiency of the principal wheat consumers, as the 
result of the increase in protectionist measures. From 1929 on, the traditionally protectionist 
countries increased their tariffs on wheat imports, and in 1932, adopted additional measures 
to reinforce their protectionist policies (Bacon and Schloemer, 1940: 40-43). In this latter 
year, even Great Britain abandoned its free trade policy and adopted some type of 
protective measures. The International Institute of Agriculture estimated that the need for 
wheat imports from the principal importers fell from an average of 800 million bushels in 
1926-27 to 1931-32 to approximately 550 million bushels in 1937-38. In the first third of 
the XX century as a whole, practically the totality of growth in the wheat trade was due to 
an increase in non-European imports, since the quantities imported by the European 
countries were stagnant until 1929 and then fell sharply. This decrease was 33 per cent 
between 1924-28 and 1934-38. 
 
3.2. World exporters and importers of wheat 
At the start of the XX century, European exports accounted for almost fifty per cent 
of total trade in wheat and flour (figure 3). Yet the war had a decisive impact. The 
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destruction of European harvests and the subsequent increase in the European demand for 
food encouraged productive regions from other continents to increase their production. 
Once the war had ended, the decline of exports from Russia and the Danube countries 
meant an extreme concentration of such exports in the United States and the countries of 
recent European colonisation (Canada, Argentina and Australia), which represented an 
extremely high proportion, oscillating between 50% and 80%. Trade, which until 1914 was 
largely intra-European (50% of exchanges), became mainly intercontinental.  
 
Figure 3: Composition of wheat exports by continent (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
Wheat flour is included  
 
The withdrawal of Russia (20.5% of world exports in 1909-13) and of the countries 
situated in the Danube basin (Hungary, Rumania, the former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) 
(14.6%) was largely the consequence of profound socioeconomic changes (table 7). 
Following the war, and due in part to the agrarian reform which took place in the majority 
of them, they decreased their exports, which proceeded in their majority from large estates. 
The reform meant that large properties were divided among small farmers, such that per 
capita income increased (Taylor, 1928). This increased income signified in some cases a 
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greater consumption of wheat in the interior of these countries, and in others, a diversion 
towards other types of crops in response to changes in relative prices or in demand 
(Imperial Economic Committee, 1932 a). The result in both cases was a fall in the wheat 
surpluses available for export. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that as the result 
of the peace agreements, the European political map changed, dislocating the economic 
relationships existing before the war. 
 
 
Table 7: Wheat production by the leading exporters  
 
 
1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38
CANADA
% world production 5.22 9.76 8.83 5.39
% world exports 11.44 35.15 31.67 28.13
Exports/production (%) 45.83 72.72 66.89 67.78
ARGENTINA
% world production 3.89 5.75 5.17 4.75
% world exports 12.04 16.82 18.56 19.48
Exports/production (%) 64.63 59.06 66.94 53.26
AUSTRALIA
% world production 2.39 3.32 3.88 3.16
% world exports 6.26 10.46 12.92 16.3
Exports/production (%) 54.61 63.68 62.04 66.92
UNITED STATES
% world production 18.26 19.1 18.56 14.78
% world exports 12.52 21.36 14.84 7.35
Exports/production (%) 14.33 22.59 14.91 6.45
DANUBIAN COUNT.
% world production 8.32 6.63 6.92 6.79
% world exports 14.56 4.23 5.43 7.73
Exports/production (%) 36.56 12.88 14.65 14.79
RUSSIA
% world production 20.03 17.49 17.12 25.82
% world exports 20.47 2.13 4.84 3.05
Exports/production (%) 21.35 2.46 5.28 1.54
 
 
Source: Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
Wheat flour is included. * Danube countries: Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia or Yugoslavia. Changes in borders 
have not been taken into account. 
 
In Russia, following the war and with the coming of the Revolution, a series of 
changes occurred which meant that exports were nil or insignificant, until by the year 1930 
the figure of 100 million bushels was exceeded. According to the experts of the Imperial 
Economic Committee, the absence of Russian wheat exports between 1920 and 1930 was 
due not so much to poor harvests (although in fact there were bad harvests in 1922, 1923 
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and 1924) or the division of large estates (from where the majority of wheat destined for 
export during the prewar years came) among small peasants and their subsequent 
collectivization, but instead to a greater internal consumption of wheat, as a result of both 
demographic increase and a rise in per capita consumption, and in part to the resistance of 
small farmers to produce a surplus for export, given the scanty rewards they were offered 
by the state (Imperial Economic Committee, 1932 b: 85). 
   
Table 8: World imports of wheat and flour (Thousands of quintals)  
 
 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38 
Europe 172,556 179,393 174,082 120,003 
North & C. America 3,601 9,653 9,638 12,103 
South America 6,997 11,443 12,031 11,545 
Asia 5,329 18,314 28,506 18,279 
Africa 5,184 6,817 7,998 5,151 
Oceania 179 992 631 761 
Total 193,846 226,612 232,886 167,842 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
 
Imports of wheat and wheat flour were clearly dominated by the European continent. 
Europe imported between 70% and 90% of all wheat traded (table 8). However, its 
importance declined as the period advanced, while the relative weight of the remaining 
continents increased as importers of wheat. The growth of Asian imports is notable, rising 
from 2.8% in the period 1909-13 to 10.9% in the 1930s. By volume, Asian imports of 
wheat rose from 5,328,740 quintals in 1909-13 to 18,279,200 quintals in 1934-38, a rise of 
243%. This was probably due to the growth of personal income (especially in Japan), which 
as we have seen produced a growth in the demand for wheat for the production of bread to 
substitute other cereals, and to the sharp growth in population in many zones. As well as in 
India, rice and wheat behaved as substitute foods, their demand depending on their relative 
prices (Lathan and Neal, 1883). Thus, rapid population growth in China made it necessary 
to increase wheat imports to feed it. Such imports rose from only approximately 4% of total 
Asian imports of wheat until 1928, to 51.2% in 1928-32 and 40.9% in 1934-38. 
Furthermore, India moved from being an important exporter of wheat prior to the First 
World War to a net importer in many years after the war. The principal reasons for this 
were the fall in its average production of wheat in the periods 1924-28 and 1928-32 and the 
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lack of incentives to export, due to the rapid growth of population and the low international 
prices of wheat from the end of the 1920s on. 
3.3. The working of the international wheat market 
 As already seen, at the end of the 1920s tensions began to appear in the international 
wheat market. The volume of trade continued to increase until it reached a maximum in 
1929, although in the European continent it had already begun to decline. This problematic 
situation was clearly reflected in wheat prices, which displayed a slight decreasing trend 
from 1925 onwards. From 1929 prices fell drastically (figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Evolution of wheat prices and the wholesale price index in Britain (100 = 
1913) 
 
 
 
 
Blue= Whosale price index 
Pink= Wheat prices 
Source: Wheat: C.I.F. unit values from The Annual Statement of the Trade of the U.K. with foreign 
countries and British countries. Wholesale price index: Mitchell (1992), p. 739. 
  
Even more interesting is the comparison of wheat prices with those in the rest of the 
economy. If we compare them with a wholesale price index for Great Britain, we can 
approximate their evolution in real terms. Figure 5 shows that until approximately 1921, 
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wheat prices evolved in consonance with those in the rest of the economy, meaning that the 
purchasing power of wheat producers did not change significantly. From then on, two 
periods can be observed, the first between 1922 and 1924 and the second from 1928 until 
the end of the period, in which the price of wheat fell by more than the wholesale price 
index. Between 1926 and 1934 wheat prices deflated by the wholesale price index fell by 
approximately 43%. This continuous decline in prices from the mid-1920s until the mid-
1930s was known at that time as “the wheat problem”. 
The problematic situation of the wheat market was also reflected in a progressive 
increase in unsold wheat stocks. The same occurred with other agricultural products. From 
mid-1925 on, the progressive accumulation of stocks of the principal foodstuffs caused a 
fall in their international prices (Figure 5). Hevesy (1940: 207) stated that the stocks 
accumulated in these years were unsaleable, since not even the wheat which was offered to 
merely cover transport costs found any purchasers. 
 
Figure 5: Price indices and stocks of major food products (base 1923-25 = 100) 
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Source: Timoshenko (1933: 122). 
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 The simple fact of accumulating stocks was a motive for price instability. Agents in 
the market were concerned by the fact of not knowing the exact quantity accumulated or 
the moment at which it would be placed on the market. Another of the consequences of 
accumulated stocks was that there did not occur the adjustments in the cultivated land area 
which a free market situation would have demanded. (Imperial Economic Committee,1932 
b: 81). 
The problem of the increasing accumulation of stocks began to be important 
following the great wheat harvest of 1928 (Liverpool Corn Trade Association, 1953: 42) 
(Table 9). Thus, the margins between available wheat supply and total utilization (including 
all the uses of wheat), plus the normal reserves, were increasingly greater, reflected in an 
increase of stocks (Table 9). In this way, the decreasing trend of wheat prices corresponded 
with a significant increase in stocks from approximately 1922. Meanwhile, production 
continued to grow, reaching a maximum in 1929. 
 
 
Table 9. World wheat supply and approximate total use (millions of quintals)  
 
Year Available supply a) Total use plus normal reserves 
 
Stocks 
July 
Harvests 
exc-Russia 
exc-China 
Russian 
exports 
Total Total use  
b) 
Normal 
reserves  c) 
Total 
1921-22 130 845 … 974 836 122 958 
1922-23 138 859 … 997 872 125 997 
1923-24 125 947 6 1,079 922 128 1,050 
1924-25 157 839 … 996 882 131 1,013 
1925-26 114 901 7 1,023 892 133 1,025 
1926-27 131 917 13 1,062 920 136 1,056 
1927-28 142 978 2 1,122 961 139 1,100 
1928-29 161 1,064 … 1,225 991 142 1,133 
1929-30 234 931 3 1,167 947 144 1,091 
1930-31 220 1,003 30 1,254 1,008 147 1,155 
1931-32 246 d) 986 d) 22 d) 1,254 d) 1,012 150 d) 1,162 
 
Source: Davis (1932): 422. 
a) Wheat Studies, VIII, 177, 182, 190, 401, with a slight revision of the latest data. 1 bushel of weight = 0.27216 quintals) 
Subtracting the estimated stocks of the coming year from total supply. c) Rough approximation. In the article cited, 
normal reserves are calculated as 450 million bushels for the year 1921-22 and increase by 10 million bushels each year. 
d) Preliminary 
 
 
The problem of wheat was a problem of imbalance between supply and demand, 
which led to an excessive supply of wheat at international level pushing prices down. This 
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problem appeared from the First World War on, since in the prewar period wheat supply 
and demand increased at approximately the same rhythm, meaning the market situation was 
one of equilibrium. Specifically, Paul de Hevesy (1940) stated that the problem of 
overproduction was important between 1926 and 1934. 
In the case of wheat, the most important factor in the determination of its 
international prices throughout the period under study was the supply available in the 
market (Timoshenko, 1928). This depended not only on the harvest which had recently 
been gathered, but also on the stocks accumulated from previous years and the forecasts 
made regarding the quality of the following harvest. Apart from these factors, the poor 
international economic situation during the 1930s depressed wheat prices and limited the 
growth of international demand. With regard to demand, this was fairly stable, being 
modified very slowly with population growth, and thus did not affect the annual variations 
in international prices. Nevertheless, demand factors can be important in the determination 
of the trend in international prices in the long term. In general, annual price movements 
represented changes in the supply-demand relationship. The most important factors in this 
relationship were: expectations regarding the following harvest, the quantity of 
accumulated stocks, the prices of other cereals and the prices of other foodstuffs (e.g. meat 
and potatoes). 
 In summary, it can be stated that the principal causes of the problem of wheat were: 
the implementation of protectionist measures in the second half of the 1920s and their 
strengthening from 1932 onwards in the largest importers (Germany, France and Italy), 
which also stimulated the national production of wheat with the objective of self-
sufficiency, and in addition the implementation of this type of policy in the until then free 
trade countries (Great Britain, The Netherlands and Denmark); the emergence of Russia as 
an important exporter, for the first time since the First World War, in the years 1930-31 
(Davis, 1932: 431); and finally and most importantly, the increasing disequilibrium 
between worldwide wheat supply and demand, due principally to the increase in worldwide 
production available for export, while consumption remained stagnant or fell in the large 
consumer countries. The worldwide production of wheat increased greatly throughout the 
first third of the twentieth century (Table 10). This increase in the volume of production 
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had two causes: the increase in yields per hectare (intensive growth) and the rise in the 
number of hectares sown with wheat (extensive growth).  
The continuous growth in the worldwide production of wheat was possible due to 
technological innovation. The technological advances which permitted greater production 
of wheat were, principally: research into new species of seeds which were adapted perfectly 
to each type of soil and climatology, the increasingly generalized of fertilizers and the 
introduction of machinery (Olmstead and Rhode, 2008). In overseas countries, like 
Australia or Canada, technical advances were aimed at increasing production per worker. 
The introduction of capital-intensive and labour-saving technology in these countries 
reflected their endowment of productive factors. Labour power was scarce and land was 
fertile, virgin and abundant; consequently, labour costs were greater and land costs lower 
than in the European continent; overseas countries were interested in achieving very high 
productivity per worker. However, in Europe, much more densely populated, the objective 
was the opposite and technical advances were directed at increasing yields per hectare. 
(Pujol, 2011). 
 
Table 10. Growth of world wheat production (1909-13 = 100) 
1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38
100 111 120 130
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
 
 The extensive increase in the production of wheat in overseas countries was linked 
principally to their colonisation and the great migration they attracted (Malenbaum, 1953: 
128-129). A fundamental characteristic of the expansion of production in these countries 
was that once investment had been made in the ploughing of virgin lands for the cultivation 
of wheat, in response to the increase in demand or prices, it was very difficult to reduce the 
number of hectares as a consequence of poor market conditions. The initial costs faced by 
farmers were high and inflexible with regard to the variation in wheat prices, meaning that 
the majority of farmers were reticent to reduce the number of hectares cultivated once they 
had incurred the costs of placing them under production; instead, they hoped to recover 
their losses when the market situation improved. In addition, agricultural activity, in 
 20
general, included all the family, and thus the costs associated with the abandoning of such 
activity were much greater than if only one member of the family was involved. The 
reaction to a fall in prices, which reduced agricultural income and increased indebtedness in 
the sector, was precisely to produce still more, since farmers attempted to maintain gross 
income and reduce general expenditure, which increased the gravity of the situation. A 
reduction in prices therefore coexisted with increases in production. The technical advances 
which were intensified in this period also permitted an increase in productive capacity 
while reducing costs. 
The return of the Soviet Union to the group of exporters at the end of the 1920s, 
although in quantities far lower than the prewar figures, doubtless led to a greater market 
saturation. 
In the increase of production a decisive role was also played by the protectionist 
policies applied by the principal importing countries, thereby encouraging the increase in 
the number of cultivated hectares by maintaining prices high in this way, especially from 
1929 on (Table 11). Hevesy (1940: 41-42) states that between 1924 and 1931, wheat prices 
in Liverpool fell by 52%, while in France, Germany and Italy they rose by 39%, 60% and 
2% respectively. In these three countries the number of hectares dedicated to wheat rose 
between 1919-24 and 1929-34. The increase was approximately 46% in Germany, 6.4% in 
Italy and 3.3% in France. The increase in the land area cultivated with wheat continued 
uninterruptedly in Germany and Italy until the end of the 1930s. 
While protectionist policies had been based between 1880 and 1929 on simple 
customs tariffs, from the latter year until 1934 supplementary measures were utilized to 
reinforce protection, such as the establishment of obligatory percentages for the quantity of 
national wheat which the flour produced in a certain country must have had or quotas on 
the importation of cereals from abroad; finally, until the start of the war there was complete 
state control of foreign trade and the wheat market. Even countries which had traditionally 
been free traders ended up by joining the protectionist camp. Not even the United Kingdom 
escaped. 
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Table 11. Import duties on wheat, 1926-1936 (in gold francs per quintal) 
 
  1926 1928 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Austria  0.26 0.26 2.1 2.1 10.5 9.62 16.8 16.8 16.8 
Belgium 0 0 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 *1.45 *1.04 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 * 0 * 0 *0.31 
France 2.68 7.11 10.15 16.24 16.24 16.24 16.24 16.24 16.24 
Germany 4.32 6.17 8.03 º 3.89 
º 
13.81 
º 
13.89 
º 
13.89 *4.32 *4.32 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 * 0 * 0 *0.74 
Italy 7.5 7.5 14 16.5 19.65 19.95 20.47 19.78 *18.4 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 *3.12 *3.12 *4.17 
Norway * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 
Sweden 5.14 5.14 5.14 5.14 *3.62 *3.51 *3.15 *2.88 *2.9 
Switzerland *0.6 *0.6 *0.6 *0.6 *0.6 *0.6 *0.6 *0.6 *0.6 
Tchecoslovaquie 1.93 4.61 4.61 *8.45 *8.45 *8.45 *11.5 *9.6 *9.6 
U.K. 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.76 0.7 0.7 
U.S.A. 5.71 5.71 5.71 8 8 8 5.03 4.76 4.72 
Source Hevesy (1940), p. 762. 
º Indicates that imports against payment of the given import duty are subject to special conditions 
* indicates that all imports are under special control (quota, licence system, monopoly, etc.) 
Gold franc is the pre-devaluation Swiss franc. After devaluation (26 September 1936) however, original  
prices have been converted into U.S. dollars and multiplied by 3.061, which can be considered as the rate of 
exchange between the dollar and the former gold franc. 
 
The Great Depression was also an indirect factor of great importance in maintaining 
low wheat prices. For Davis (1932), the worsening of the international economic situation 
negatively affected the course of trade exchanges, restricting foreign credit (which on other 
occasions had facilitated the increase of imports) and increasing restrictions on trade. 
Consequently, the poor economic situation in diverse countries reduced the demand for 
wheat in the European countries. The situation of increasing protectionism and the lack of 
confidence in political relations led to the following in many cases of agricultural policies 
of self-sufficiency, which had as a result the increase in the number of hectares cultivated 
and the extension of cultivation to lands of poorer quality, due to new seeds and technical 
advances (Hevesy, 1940). On the demand side, there was a tendency in the principal 
consumer countries to a decrease in the consumption of cereals as per capita income 
increased. Consequently, despite demand increasing with demographic growth, the fact that 
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demand per capita tended to fall resulted in very slow growth of worldwide demand. Thus, 
according to the calculations of Malenbaum (1953: 244-245), per capita consumption fell 
significantly in overseas exporting countries and very slightly for European importers. In 
addition, the International Institute of Agriculture calculated in 1931 a slight decrease in 
per capita consumption in Europe and one considerably higher in the United States. This, 
added to the gentle growth in population, meant very small increases in consumption in 
absolute terms between the years prior to the war and 1930 (Societé des Nations, 1931:28). 
The crisis of 1929 was not the cause of consumption per capita of wheat in 1929-34 being 
lower than that of 1924-29. Instead, falling income in the industrialised countries meant 
little change in a pattern of consumption taking place in a diet still basically composed of 
cereals towards a much more diversified one. 
In short, in our opinion the problem of wheat was a result of the growth of worldwide 
supply in excess of that of demand. The origin of this disequilibrium between supply and 
demand was to be found in the increase in production by overseas countries, encouraged by 
the extraordinary demand for wheat proceeding from the countries directly involved in the 
First World War, during the years of conflict and during the post-war epoch, until the 
recovery of their harvests. Once European production had recovered, worldwide supply 
outstripped the needs of consumption, meaning that international prices tended to fall. It is 
from that moment on when the activity of governments, in both the exporting countries and 
the principal importers, accentuated the problem of oversupply. As we have seen, in all 
cases (with the exception of Great Britain until 1932) governments implemented 
agricultural and trade policies which protected wheat farmers from the low international 
prices prevailing. Thus, not only did worldwide production not fall, but instead continued 
to increase in many cases. The slow growth of demand, as a consequence of the 
improvement of per capita income in the most developed countries, contributed to creating 
an unfavourable backdrop. 
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3.4. International attempts to solve the problem of wheat: the failure of the London 
Conference   
The problem of low wheat prices affected more those countries for which this product 
represented an important percentage of the total value of their exports. In the period 
between 1926 and 1930, the percentage which the value of the exports of wheat and wheat 
flour represented in total exports was 31% for Canada, 27% for Argentina, 17% for 
Australia, 8% for the Soviet Union and only 5% for the United States (I.E.C., 1932: 11). 
However, all these countries had reduced their dependence on wheat around the mid-1930s. 
Thus, between 1932 and 1936, these percentages were 22.5% for Canada, 17.3% for 
Argentina, 14.8% for Australia, 6.7% for the Soviet Union and 1.2% for the United States. 
(Imperial Economic Committee, 1939: 43). As a result, countries such as Canada, 
Argentina and Australia suffered much more deeply the economic consequences of the fall 
in wheat prices than countries such as the United States or the Soviet Union. This fact 
probably explains the different behaviour of the first three countries on the one hand and 
that of the United States on the other. Thus, when international wheat prices were very low, 
the United States was capable of reducing its volume of exports, accumulating stocks or 
establishing export quotas, while the other three large overseas exporters further increased 
their exports in an attempt to recover part of the export revenue which they lost as the 
consequence of low prices.  
In the international sphere, there were various attempts to solve the problems of 
falling wheat prices through the holding of numerous international conferences. 
Specifically, in the years 1930-31, 16 international conferences were held with this 
objective. Both partial conferences (of countries which shared common private interests) 
and those which included all the countries involved in the problem, were no more than 
successive attempts to clarify the problem and propose solutions, whose implementation 
was not successful.  
Among the distinct solutions proposed, that of creating a system of export quotas 
among the exporting countries, producing a cartel of the international marketing of wheat, 
was that which achieved the greatest number of supporters. This proposal was taken to the 
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London Conference, the most important of all, held from 18-23 May 1931 to give concrete 
form to the details of a law to be ratified by the principal exporting countries. 
Before its holding the exporting European countries met to propose the signing of an 
agreement between importing and exporting countries to give preferential treatment to 
exports of wheat from Europe, without applying the clause of most favoured nation to the 
remaining exporting countries. Some European importers, such as Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, supported the proposal, as they saw such an agreement as a solution to 
exchange manufactures for wheat, but others opposed it, such as Great Britain, which 
already had agreements with the Commonwealth countries. When this proposal was 
presented to the League of Nations, this organisation could not support it, since one of its 
missions was to reduce the restrictions on international trade. As was logical, neither were 
the overseas exporting countries in agreement with the measure. The European exporting 
countries did not consider themselves responsible for the overproduction of wheat. By the 
end of the 1920s their production of wheat was lower than that prior to the First World 
War, and thus the problem was approached as a problem of low prices and not as one of 
imbalance between supply and demand. Furthermore, they believed they had a “historic 
right” to receive preference for their exports in comparison to those from overseas countries 
and to be awarded a quota equal to the quantity of exports in the prewar period (Taylor, 
1931: 450). This meant that only did they see no obligation to reduce the number of 
hectares of wheat, but instead in some cases the possibility of increasing them was 
considered. Nevertheless, these countries believed that without the collaboration of all the 
exporting countries, it would be impossible to reach the objective of raising international 
wheat prices. Consequently, the idea of an intra-European system of preferences was 
abandoned and the creation of a system of quotas in the international sphere was proposed. 
Thus, the London Conference hosted the 11 most important exporting countries, with 
the intention of reaching an agreement upon the quotas which would be assigned to each 
country, the subsidies foreseen for the accumulation of stocks, the method of sanctioning 
those countries which did not respect the agreement, etc. The 11 countries participating in 
this conference were Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Hungary, India, Poland, the 
Soviet Union, Rumania, Yugoslavia and the United States.  
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From among them, it is logical that those proposing the measure, that is to say the 
European countries with the exception of the Soviet Union, supported it. What appears less 
logical was that Argentina, Australia and Canada accepted the measure “in principle”. With 
regard to Argentina and Australia, the reason why they supported the measure, in the 
opinion of Taylor (1931), was because they thought that prices would be better maintained 
if only part of their production, and not all, was traded on the free market. In the case of 
Canada, it appears that its representatives at the conference believed that as Canadian wheat 
was of good quality and was necessary in mixtures to obtain the best wheat for bread, the 
quotas it would obtain would be satisfactory. The United States was the only country which 
from the start opposed the quota system. This country saw clearly that the problem of wheat 
was a problem of overproduction and not of low prices, and that the only solution to raise 
prices was to reduce the number of hectares cultivated in the international sphere, thereby 
reducing total supply. Its scanty dependence on wheat exports permitted it a more objective 
analysis of the situation. As we have seen, the European exporting countries were not 
disposed to reduce the number of hectares cultivated. Lastly, Canada, Australia and 
Argentina, despite admitting that the land area dedicated to wheat had increased greatly 
since 1914, without taking into account their needs for internal consumption, saw no path 
to reduce the number of hectares cultivated with wheat, and further alleged that the 
extension of wheat cultivation had been performed to colonise new lands, that production 
was highly mechanised and was obtained at very low cost, and thus urged countries with 
high production costs to reduce their cultivated land area. In addition, it was very important 
to be able to maintain revenue from wheat exports. Given this, and due to the lack of 
agreement, the London Conference closed without having reached any decision with regard 
to solving the problem of wheat. 
 
4. International trade in maize  
Although the worldwide production of wheat and maize was quite similar, the 
volume of international trade in maize was only 40% of that of wheat. The principal reason 
was that in the United States, the principal producer, the greater part of harvests was 
destined to internal consumption (80% to cattle feed).  
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The volume of international trade in maize increased throughout 1900 and 1938 by 
44.3%, which is equivalent to an annual growth rate of 1.5%. It increased uninterruptedly 
until the First World War. During the war years, exchanges fell by more than 50 percentage 
points, which indicates a fall proportionately greater than that of cereals as a whole. 
However, following the war, trade in maize evolved more dynamically than overall trade in 
all cereals, even increasing during the years of the Great Depression (Table 3). 
In distinction to what occurred with other cereals, the consumption of maize, above 
all as livestock feed, increased throughout the period. Thus, while international exchanges 
of other feed cereals, such as barley or oats, diminished, the international trade in maize 
increased. As maize was principally used for animal feed, its worldwide demand depended 
on its relative price in comparison to feed cereals and other products which were also used 
to feed livestock. The relative price of maize fell following the First World War with regard 
to other cereals and livestock feed, which doubtless favoured its demand (Imperial 
Economic Committee, 1934: 40). 
 
Table 12. Regional distribution of maize imports (thousands of quintals and 
percentages) 
 
 1909-
13 
1924-
28 
1928-32 1934-38 % 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-8 
Europe 64,482 77,198 91,028 86,393  91.9 92.5 94.8 85.3 
North & 
Central 
America 
4,898 4,963 3,743 11,538  7.0 5.9 3.9 11.4 
South 
America 
131 224 94 60  0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Asia 27 278 673 2,293  0.0 0.3 0.70 2.3 
Africa 493 567 444 906  0.7 0.7 0.46 0.9 
Oceania 123 243 52 53  0.2 0.3 0.05 0.1 
Total 70,154 83,473 96,035 101,242  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
 
With regard to imports, Europe was by far the principal purchasing region (Table 
12). The relative importance of European imports increased uninterruptedly until the 
beginning of the 1930s, from 91.9% of total worldwide imports prior to the war to 94.8% in 
the years 1928-32. In the second half of the 1930s, European imports were equivalent to 
 27
85.3% of the worldwide total and the imports of North and Central America had risen from 
3.9% of the worldwide total in 1928-32 to 11.4% at the end of the 1930s. The fall in 
European importance after 1932 was probably due to the increase in protectionist measures 
in Europe and to the increase in the production of maize in European countries by some 28 
million quintals. Similarly, the growth in the imports by North and Central America in the 
second half of the 1930s was possibly due to the fall in production and the increase in 
internal consumption, above all in the United States, which multiplied its imports of maize 
by 47 between 1928-32 and 1934-38. The principal importing country within the European 
continent was Great Britain, including Ireland; its imports constituted between 22 and 38 
per cent of European imports. Following Great Britain and Ireland, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Belgium and France were the most significant importers.  
 
Table 13. Regional distribution of maize exports (thousands of quintals and 
percentages) 
 
 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38 % 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38 
Europe 28,968 17,854 16,0145 13,221  40.1 20.9 16.6 13.0 
North & 
Central 
America 
11,051 4,929 4,055 8,482  15.3 5.8 4.21 8.3 
South 
America 
29,460 54,332 66,078 65,740  40.7 63.6 68.5 64.7 
Asia 1,414 2,268 3,665 7,606  2.0 2.7 3.8 7.5 
Africa 1,406 5,951 6,584 6,618  1.9 7.0 6.8 6.5 
Oceania 8 159 25 15  0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Total 72,307 85,493 96,422 101,683  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
 
At the head of maize-exporting regions was South America (Table 13). Prior to the 
First World War, this region shared leadership with Europe, since it constituted 40.7% of 
worldwide exports and Europe 40%. The countries of North and Central America were also 
very important exporters before the war, constituting 15.3% of the world total.  
 Following the war, South America affirmed its leadership of the maize-exporting 
regions, while the relative importance of Europe and Central America fell. This was due in 
part to the increase in the land area cultivated with maize in Argentina from 1925 onwards 
and to the growth of production. In turn, the internal consumption of maize in Argentina 
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was very small, due to the low population density per unit of land area, and to the existence 
of abundant natural pastures for the feeding of livestock (Pinilla and Aparicio, 2015).  
Thus, in the period 1924-28 and during the greater part of the 1930s, over 80% of the maize 
which participated in international trade came from Argentina and the countries of the 
Danube basin. According to data from the International Institute of Agriculture, 
Argentinean exports of maize constituted 40.6% of total worldwide exports in 1909-13, 
63.5% in 1924-28, 68.4 % in 1928-32 and 64.2% in 1934-38. 
 
5. International trade in rice  
Until the early decades of the XIX century, the United States was the principal 
exporter of rice. Subsequently, the South-East Asian countries moved to the head of 
exporters (Coclanis, 1993 and 1995). The cause of the decline of the United States in 
favour of other producing regions is to be found in the interior of the United States as much 
as in events in the rest of the world. On the one hand, the land suitable for this type of crop 
was limited and that which was already under cultivation was losing part of its richness. On 
the other, other more dynamic crops, such as cotton and tobacco, competed for the capital 
and land available. Furthermore, the Civil War, the abolition of slavery and the destruction 
of harvests due to the war contributed to its decline. In addition, American rice had to face 
increasing competition from other zones, among them Italy, Brazil, Bengal, Java and, 
shortly afterwards, Burma, Thailand and Indochina. The ascent to the leadership of rice 
exporters of the countries of South East Asia was produced as the result of their excellent 
price competitiveness. Both land and labour were much cheaper than in the American 
continent or in Europe. Often, the labour power of the economic unit was not remunerated. 
There also existed much fertile land, unused and suitable for the cultivation of rice. 
Furthermore, in distinction to what occurred in the cases of cotton or tobacco, Asian 
productivity in the production of rice was not characterized by being lower than in other 
regions of the globe. Elsewhere, the military and economic control exercised by the 
European countries in the region determined a large part of the productive and commercial 
decisions, facilitating in addition the capital necessary for the commercialisation of rice. 
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The response of some Western producers to the considerable international supply 
from South-West Asia was the establishment of tariffs to protect national production. Thus, 
in the XIX century, the United States, Brazil and Italy, for example, raised their tariffs on 
rice imports.  
In the first third of the XX century the international trade in rice evolved much more 
dynamically than exchanges of wheat and of cereals in general. In contrast to events with 
other cereals (except maize), the long-term tendency of this trade increased until the end of 
the period analysed. This was due, probably, to the lesser importance of Europe as an 
importer in the international rice trade. This can be observed by the lower fall in the 
exchanges of rice during the First World War. Additionally, the growth of rice exchanges 
during the 1930s was achieved as it was possible to find markets to replace Europe.  
 
Table 14. Regional distribution of rice imports (thousands of quintals and 
percentages) 
 
 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38 % 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38 
Europe 18,680 14,098 13,910 16,039  33.1 19.2 17.8 19.6 
North & 
Central 
America 
2,554 4,157 4,040 4,350  4.5 5.7 5.2 5.3 
South 
America 
1,1845 2,038 1,732 1,357  2.1 2.8 2.2 1.7 
Asia 30,804 49,658 54,790 55,348  54.6 67.5 70.1 67.6 
Africa 2,783 2,926 3,068 4,019  4.9 3.9 3.9 4.9 
Oceania 398 693 672 777  0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 
Total 56,405 73,570 78,212 81,889  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
  
Before War World I there already existed a complex international network of trade 
in rice and an integrated international market in rice. Burma, Thailand and French Indo-
China were the main exporters (Latham and Neal, 1983). Most of these exports were 
directed to other Asian regions, China and Japan being important importing countries 
(Brandt, 1985 and 1993). 
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Between 54.6% and 70% of worldwide imports of rice were destined to the Asian 
continent (table 14). The importance of Asia as an importing region increased throughout 
the period. After Asia, Europe was the principal destination of international rice exchanges. 
However, there can be observed a progressive fall in European imports of rice as the period 
advanced, until the early 1930s. This decrease occurred in a context of the growth of 
European production of rice and of tariff restrictions. During the 1930s, the decreasing 
trend of European rice imports halted due to the increase in French imports from its 
colonies in Asia. This was a French attempt to compensate for the fall in demand in the 
principal Asian import markets from 1930 on, which affected Vietnam and Thailand 
especially severely. Until the end of the XIX century Japan was a net exporter of rice, but 
from then on became an increasing net importer. From 1920 onwards, Japan initiated a 
policy of self-sufficiency in the provision of food and directed its demand for imports to its 
two colonies, Korea and Taiwan. From 1930, approximately, Japan was capable of 
supplying its population with its national production and with imports from these two 
countries. Prior to 1928, Japan needed to import great quantities of rice from outside the 
frontiers of its empire. These imports came principally from Thailand, Vietnam and Burma, 
and some rice was also imported from the United States (Wickizer and Bennett, 1941:91).  
Before the First World War, imports from its colonies were approximately one third of total 
imports. In 1922-27 they were already 97% (Brandt, 1993: 274).The principal rice 
exporters did not only lose the Japanese market due to the high tariffs (approximately  
40%) which rice had to pay on entering the country but, from approximately 1925, the 
demand for rice also fell in three significant importers, China, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. 
 The fall in Chinese imports was the most important (Table 15). Between 1921 and 
1935, these were of the order of between 650,000 and 1,350,000 tons annually, but they fell 
to an average of between 300,000 and 400,000 tons between 1936-39. This fall in imports 
was in part due to the need for China to balance its payments, and on the other hand to 
policies of self-sufficiency in food. Burma was the exporting country least affected by the 
fall in demand in these Asian countries, since it was able to continue exporting to India, 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Malaysia and Europe. However, Thailand and Vietnam suffered more 
from the consequences of the fall in Asian demand, as they could only export to Malaysia 
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and the non-Asian markets, principally Europe. Thailand had an advantage in exporting to 
Malaysia and to non-European markets such as Cuba, while Vietnam, as part of the French 
empire, enjoyed the preference of certain European markets (Wickizer and Bennett, 
1941:95).  
 
 
Table 15. Principal importers of rice (thousands of quintals) 
 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38 
Germany 4,169 4,078 3,479 2,295
France 2,588 2,414 3,021 6,571
Sri Lanka 3,859 4,672 4,888 5,344
China 3,040 9,465 9,261 6,259
Hong Kong … … a) 7,821 5,091
Japan 4,756 16,138 14,970 18,983
Malaysia 1,807 7,414 7,514 7,205
Philippines 1,872 758 372 378
India 1,613 1,789 1,564 6,365
Indonesia 4,558 5,313 5,957 2,802
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
a) Average 1931-32.  
 
The principal importers of rice in the 1930 were Japan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, India and 
France. The first and last of these countries had preferential agreements with their 
respective colonies, meaning that the remaining exporters only had available important 
markets for their respective productions in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and India. According to 
Wickizer and Bennett (1941), the expansion of the imports of these countries was due as 
much to population growth as to the specialisation of domestic industries, which meant a 
fall in the relative importance of the domestic production of rice. 
The growth of imports from these countries, plus the growth of the non-Asian 
countries, served to cover the fall in exports to Japan, China, Indonesia and the Philippines 
in the 1930s (Wickizer and Bennett, 1941: 97). 
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Table 16. Regional distribution of rice exports (thousands of quintals and 
percentages) 
 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38 % 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38 
Europe 7,167 5,978 4,943 3,728  12.2 8.0 6.3 4.5 
N.& C. 
America 
702 1,929 2,797 2,259  1.2 2.6 3.6 2.7 
South 
America 
84 193 657 879  0.1 0.3 0.8 1.1 
Asia 50,152 65,229 69,562 74,719  85.7 87.9 88.3 90.1 
Africa 345 815 763 1,200  0.6 1.1 0.9 1.5 
Oceania 86 79 53 129  0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Total 58,536 74,223 78,775 82,914  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
 
 As in the case of imports, the importance of the Asian continent as the origin of rice 
exports is striking. Thus, throughout the period, between 85.7 and 90.1% of world exports 
of rice came from Asian countries (table 15). Furthermore, the importance of this continent 
only increased over time, leading us to conclude that the international rice trade was almost 
exclusively located in Asia and that as purchasing power in the Asian countries increased 
so did the volume of rice exchanges. The Asian preponderance in rice exports was due as 
much to the geographical localisation of exchanges as to the comparative advantage with 
regard to production costs in the Asian countries. The cultivation of rice was labour-
intensive and much cheaper in Asia than in the rest of the rice-producing continents, 
meaning that its exports were much more competitive in the international markets. 
The importance of Europe as a rice-exporting region fell throughout the first third of 
the XX century. Thus, the annual rate of growth of European exports between 1909-13 and 
1934-39 was –2.6% (table 17).  
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Table 17. Principal exporters of rice (thousands of quintals) 
 1909-13 1924-28 1928-32 1934-38 
Germany 1,799 1,659 850 274
Italy 673 1,955 1,819 1,477
France 360 628 765 239
Burma and India 24,352 22,783 22,069 20,052
Vietnam 8,958 13,928 12,005 14,140
Thailand 7,917 12,378 11,965 14,303
Korea 933 7,875 9,373 12,123
Taiwan 1,199 3,336 3,764 6,747
Hong Kong n.a. n.a. a) 6,410 3,333
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on International Institute of Agriculture (1909-1938). 
a) Average 1931-3.  
 
Five countries exported 95 per cent of the rice which originated from monsoon Asia: 
Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Korea and Taiwan. Italy and the United States were the only 
two non-Asian countries which were important rice exporters. In turn, Germany and France 
re-exported considerable quantities of rice after refining it. According to Wickizer and 
Bennett (1941), Burma was without a doubt the principal exporter of rice at the end of the 
1930s, exporting an average of 3 million tons annually. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This study has analysed the worldwide trade in cereals in the first third of the XX 
century. These products were important not only to constitute the basis of nourishment of a 
large part of humankind (with wheat, maize and rice as key elements), but also to mean, 
consequently, a very significant part of trade in agricultural products and food in the world. 
However, their relative importance tended to diminish from the beginning of the century 
until the 1930s. This relative decline was due in part to the intensification of international 
economic relationships until 1929, which meant that more products and countries 
participated in world trade. It was also important that rising incomes in the more 
industrialised countries led to a diversification of their diets and a greater weight in them of 
products of higher income elasticity, such as meat, dairy products, oils or fruit and fresh 
vegetables. 
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Within cereals, wheat was by far the most important product, which was indubitably 
linked to the fact that in the largest food-importing region in the world, Great Britain and 
Western Europe, it was the principal dietary component and for that reason, from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards, had developed an increasing international trade in a market 
which became profoundly integrated. By contrast, maize and rice, which initially had a 
fairly small weight in the cereals trade, displayed much more dynamic behaviour due to 
their use in Europe in animal feedstuffs in the case of maize and the extension of intra-
Asian trade in the case of rice. 
In the case of wheat Europe was the principal importing and exporting region prior to 
the First World War. Following this there came very important changes, with the rise of 
overseas exporters, which ended a clearly dominant position in the market, and with the 
sharp fall of intra-European trade. Finally, the wheat market was faced with enormous 
tensions from approximately 1928 on, which the crisis of 1929 and the collapse of the first 
globalisation complicated yet further. Excess supply in the market, as a consequence of the 
strong growth in production in overseas countries, affected international wheat prices. 
Obstacles to trade in the 1930s and the outbreak of protectionism in Europe accentuated the 
problem, yet further efforts to reach international agreements with the objective of 
stabilising the market were unsuccessful. 
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